Exposure analystEXPOSEDbiggest if it happens: −$1.30B a year (−19.2% of profit)
Policy analystWEAK LINKfor results of 1% of profit or more, who wins moves the chance by 5 points at most
Market analystPRICED3 markets on Kalshi and Polymarket
Red TeamCAUTION8 flags to read
Risk Officer
Election risk
LOW
Nothing passes the bar. Biggest: +$1.00B a year (+14.7% of profit) if Congress repeals the Section 232 auto and metals tariffs, but only 5% even if Democrats win.
Policy risk
MEDIUM
Kalshi puts 6% on: the US gives notice to leave USMCA before 2027. For Ford: −$1.30B a year (−19.2% of profit).
High = share of profit × chance (policy) or × election swing (election) of at least 2% of profit; Medium at least 0.5%.
Share card
Exposure analyst
Where the profit comes from and what a government can move.
Base: FY2025 adjusted EBIT $6.78B sourceverified Full profit structure: structure.md in this folder.
Locked in regardless of the election
CAFE civil penalty set to $0 by P.L. 119-21 (July 2025): missed fuel-economy targets no longer cost fines
30D/45W EV purchase and lease credits ended Sept 30, 2025 (P.L. 119-21); Model e lost $4.8B in FY2025
Congress revoked California's ACC II waivers by Congressional Review Act (June 2025); litigation pending
UAW contract runs to April 30, 2028
IEEPA tariffs struck down 2026-02-20; Ford booked a one-time $1.3B refund in Q1 2026 that does not repeat
Section 232 auto, parts and metals tariffs stay unless a veto-proof law repeals them: the President (R) serves to January 2029
Policy analyst
What each winner would do, how, and the chance it happens if they win.
Policy book: downloaded, last edited 2026-10-27, 197 contests, fingerprint f97e319e0772. Chances come from historical rates (an upper bound for two years), not forecasts.
Market analyst and Risk Officer
Each market, its price, and the yearly profit change if it resolves.
Will Trump try to leave the USMCA before 2027?
Yes if the United States submits a notice of withdrawal from the USMCA before Jan 1, 2027. The 'before 2027' rung is used: it is the only rung with trades, and the cost would start once withdrawal takes effect six months after notice (2027). · KXUSMCA-26
If the US gives notice to leave USMCA before 2027
−$1.30B a year
-19.2% of adjusted EBIT · range −$700M to −$2.50B estimated
Market price before Jan 1, 2027
Kalshi6%
15,459 contracts
chance 6%election swing 0.00meaningful
How this number is built
Losing USMCA treatment puts the 25% Section 232 tariff on the full value of Mexico-built vehicles instead of only non-US content: ~335,000 US sales a year (Maverick ~160k, Bronco Sport ~125k, Mach-E ~52k) x ~$25,000 import value x 25% x ~50% non-US content now untaxed = ~$1.05B, plus ~$0.25B for USMCA auto parts losing their exclusion = ~-$1.3B a year before pricing actions. Low: 40% content, half passed on in price. High: 60% content plus engines/transmissions from Mexico and Canada at full 25%.
Timing: from mid-2027 if withdrawal takes effect six months after a notice
Resolves to the party that wins control of the House in 2026 (media consensus, else the Speaker's party on Feb 1, 2027). · CONTROLH-2026
If Congress repeals the Section 232 auto and metals tariffs
+$1.00B a year
+14.7% of adjusted EBIT · range +$500M to +$2.00B estimated
Who wins (chance the policy follows is estimated)
Democrats (House majority) (D)
90%
to win
Kalshi90%
23,177,648 contracts
If they win: 5% chance it happens
pass laws to overturn the President's tariffs · federal: partisan · US-house-control.md (policy book)
Republicans (House majority) (R)
10%
to win
Kalshi10%
52,433,132 contracts
If they win: 0% chance it happens
keep tariff-repeal votes off the floor; support the tariffs · block: majority · US-house-control.md (policy book)
Policy book US-house-control.md: a repeal law needs the Senate and the President's signature or a two-thirds override (federal: partisan, 0.05); a Republican House blocks it (0).
chance 5%election swing 0.05below the bar
How this number is built
Ford's net tariff cost: ~$2.0B in 2025 (company), 'better than $1B' in 2026 after offsets (CFO, Q2 2026). Repeal removes it: +$1.0B a year central; low +$0.5B (rivals importing more also gain, eroding Ford's relative price advantage); high +$2.0B (the 2025 level).
Resolves to the person elected governor of California in 2026. · KXGOVCA-26
If California relaxes its 2035 gas-car rule
+$100M a year
+1.5% of adjusted EBIT · range $0 to +$200M estimated
Who wins (chance the policy follows is estimated)
Xavier Becerra (D)
96%
to win
Kalshi96%
6,960,378 contracts
Polymarket95%
$2,508,014 traded
If they win: 5% chance it happens
'open to revising' clean-energy goals incl. the 2035 gas-car ban if fuel becomes unaffordable · vague · source
Steve Hilton (R)
4%
to win
Kalshi4%
15,945,919 contracts
Polymarket3%
$3,825,012 traded
If they win: 0% chance it happens
no row in the policy book on this rule · none
Policy book CA-governor.md: Becerra 'vague' (0.05); Hilton has no clean-cars-ev row (0).
chance 5%election swing 0.05below the bar
How this number is built
~1.75M California new-vehicle sales x Ford 7.4% share = ~130k a year x ~$750 per vehicle of avoided ZEV-compliance cost (credit purchases, EV discounting) = ~+$100M a year. Low $0: the waiver is already revoked and stays so. High: ~$1,500 per vehicle.
Timing: only if courts restore California's waiver
USMCA impact (-$1.3B) is an estimate: ~335k Mexico-built US sales (Maverick, Bronco Sport, Mach-E; 2025 sales partly extrapolated) x ~$25k import value x 25% x ~50% non-US content, plus ~$0.25B for parts. The content share and Ford's ability to price it through drive the range.
A withdrawal notice is a six-month warning, not withdrawal itself; it may be a negotiating move later withdrawn. Kalshi's thinner KXUSMCAOUTCOMES-27 prices a US withdrawal notice in 2026 at about 13% (last trade, wide spread) versus 6% here.
Tariff-repeal impact (+$1.0B) uses Ford's own 2026 net tariff cost (CFO: 'better than $1B'); repeal would also help importing rivals, so Ford's relative advantage on US-built trucks shrinks: the net could be smaller.
House control decides only half of a tariff repeal: the Senate (Kalshi D ~64%) and a presidential veto also stand in the way; the book's 0.05 for a Democratic House already reflects that. Book row for House Democrats' 0.45 'make: alone' (floor disapproval votes) is not used: disapproval resolutions do not apply to Section 232 tariffs, which are what Ford pays.
California 2035 rule: the EPA waiver is already revoked, so relaxing it matters only if courts restore it; the +$100M is a rough per-vehicle compliance-cost estimate on ~130k California sales.
Michigan governor (Benson: 'subnational agreements with Canada', book p 0.45) checked and left out: a state agreement cannot change federal tariffs Ford pays, so no dollar effect.
Policy risk MEDIUM would be HIGH at the high end (−$2.50B) of the impact range for: the US gives notice to leave USMCA before 2027. Read how the impact was built.
the US gives notice to leave USMCA before 2027: the impact is an estimate, not a reported number.